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LESSONS FROM JERRY HALL v. MICKJAGGER
REGARDING U.S. REGULATION OF
HETEROSEXUAL COHABITANTS OR,
CAN'T GET NO SATISFACTION
J. Tlwrnas Oldham*
INTRODUCTION
Jerry Hall apparently thought she was married to Mick Jagger.
She lived with him two decades and bore four children. When they
broke up, it was determined that, although they participated in a Bali-
nese marriage ceremony in 1990, they did not comply with the Bali-
nese marriage formalities.' Under English law, it was determined that
they were not married, and she had only a right to claim child sup-
port; no other rights or obligations arose under English law due to
their cohabitation. 2
Had this case arisen in the United States today, in most states the
result may well have been the same, because under the laws of most
states, "cohabitation" alone does not create a status that confers rights
and obligations.3 This Article will consider whether U.S. private law
* John H. Freeman Professor of Law, University of Houston. The author would
like to acknowledge the support of the M.D. Anderson Foundation and the University
of Houston Law Foundation. The author would like to thank his colleagues at the
University of Houston, as well as Brian Bix, Peg Brinig, June Carbone, and David
Chambers, who commented on an earlier draft of this Article. The author is also
grateful to Sheila Shelvin for word processing help and administrative assistance.
1 See Ruth Gledhill, Tw Marriage That Never Was, TiMEs (London), Aug. 14, 1999,
at 5. The marriage was not registered with the proper authorities and neither Hall
norJagger was a true member of the Hindu faith.
2 i&
3 See J.T. OLuHss, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DisrwBmto.mo OF PROPERTM
§ 1.02 (2001). Many U.S. states accept putative marriage, which gives a claimant
(even though not actually married) rights like those of a spouse if he or she believes
in good faith that they were married. See HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FX.nLY LNw, G SES,
CO~MENTS AND QuEsioNs 106 (4th ed. 1998). In those U.S. states that accept com-
mon-law marriage, the couple would have been considered married.
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rules regarding straight unmarried couples should be changed. 4 In
addition, I do not address in detail appropriate policies toward gay
couples; these issues have been ably discussed by many
commentators. 5
I. THE REGULATION OF COHABITATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. A Survey of the Legal Landscape
A century ago, in many states almost all cohabiting heterosexual
couples were married. At least in part, this was due to the acceptance
of common-law marriage by a majority of American states. 6 (By 1922,
only twenty-seven states still accepted common-law marriage. 7) So, in
many states, if a heterosexual couple lived together and represented
to the community that they were married, they were (regardless of
whether they participated in any marriage ceremony). Because of this
rule, and due to the then-prevailing social conventions that consid-
ered unmarried cohabitation socially unacceptable, it seems likely
that, in states which accepted common-law marriage, almost all cohab-
iting heterosexual couples would have been considered married. (It
4 This Article focuses on private law rights and obligations, such as quasi-marital
property rights and post-dissolution support obligations. I do not address the extent
to which unmarried partners should be considered a couple for various public pur-
poses, such as taxation or the receipt of state benefits.
5 See generally WLLIASi N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
(1996); SMIaE-SX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997); David L.
Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and
Gay Male Couples, 95 MicH. L. REV. 447 (1996) (arguing that the insitution of marriage
is here to stay for good reason and that homosexuals should not shun marriage, but
should make an effort to attain the legal right to marry); Steven K. Homer, Against
Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R1-C.L. L. REv. 505 (1994) (arguing that "marriage lacks legal as
well as experiential coherence"); Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce
Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREiGHTON L. REV. 187 (1998) (dis-
cussing Williams land Williams Ilin the context of the potential for interstate recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages); Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law:
Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, B.C. L. REV. 265 (2000) (ana-
lyzing recent scholarship and arguing that the quest for marriage by same-gender
couples should be seen as positive, as it strives toward connection, duty, and
responsibility).
6 See generally OTro E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE (1922); StuartJ. Stein,
Common Law Marriage: Its History and Certain Contemporary Problems, 9 J. FAM. L. 271
(1969); Nancy IL Shaw, Note, Common Law Marriage and Unmarried Cohabitation: An
Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 579, 580 (1978).
For example, in 1878 the Supreme Court, in referring to a private agreement to
be married, stated in Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1878), "That such a contract consti-
tutes a marriage at common law there can be no doubt...." Id. at 78.
7 KOEGEL, supra note 6, at 164-65.
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would have been too embarrassing to proclaim to the community that
you were not married.)
During the twentieth century, both the law and social conven-
tions changed. Many states abolished common-law marriage. 8 In ad-
dition, unmarried cohabitation has become much more common and
socially acceptable in many levels of society. In contrast to the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, it is now quite possible, even in a
state that accepts common-law marriage, that a heterosexual couple
could live together and have a sexual relationship and not be consid-
ered married. (A couple no longer has to feign marriage or risk social
opprobrium.) As a result, and because in most states cohabitants have
no "status"-like rights, regardless of the duration of the cohabitation
or whether the relationship was childless or minor children were in
the household, an "unmarried" couple can cohabit for a long period
and raise children and still have no rights or obligations (other than
child support) when the relationship ends.
As is true in most of the Western world,9 unmarried cohabitation
is becoming an increasingly common family form in the United States.
As of 1994, about 7% of all heterosexual American couples were un-
married partners.' 0 In most of Western Europe, the percentage is
higher; in Denmark, more than 20% of all couples are unmarried
8 About ten states now accept this form of marriage. Se KRausE ET AL., supra
note 3, at 96.
9 See Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western Europe, 96 PoPuLunoN TRE,.NDs 25,
25 (1999).
10 See Having It Both Ways, d laFrancais EcONOMisT, Sept. 26, 1998, at 54 [herein-
after Having It Both Ways); see also ARLENE F. SALUTER, BuPZU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
D]) 'T OF COMMERCE, CuRRENr POPUL.TION REPORTS, SERIES P20-484, MNtrrAL STA"US
AND LiNG ARRANGEmNTS: MAcH 1994 at xiii (1996) (reporting national statistics
for "unmarried-couple households" and comparing them to the 1970 statistics). Ac-
cording to the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey of March 1998, 1,674,000
same-sex couples existed, compared to 4,236,000 heterosexual unmarried couples
and 54,317,000 married couples. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENm Poput,%Tro-N SuR-
vEY, MArrAL STATUS AND LiviNG ARRANGE EMENTs: MAgc.H 1998 (UPDATE) at v tbl.C, 71
tbl.8 (1998), available at http://iv.census.gov/population/iww/v/socdemo/ms-
la.html (last modifiedJune 29, 2001). For a chart showing the trends in cohabitation
in the U.S., see Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation:
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NoTRE D.,%It L. RFEv. 1265,
1268 n.11 (2001). The most recent Census report found that unmarried partners
now comprise 9% of all couples. See Eric Schmitt, For First Time, Nudcar Families Drop
Below 25% of Households, N.Y. TmIms, May 15, 2001, at Al.
Of course, cohabitation might be more common among certain segments ofsoci-
ety than others. See Kathleen Rieman, The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside
Marriage in Westem Europe, 15 INT'LJ.L POL'Y & FAM. 1, 8-10 (2001).
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partners." In Australia, as of 1996, it was estimated that, of all
couples, more than 10% were de facto couples. 12 In 1996, 14% of all
Canadian couples residing together were unmarried. 13
Cohabitation is particularly popular among the young. For exam-
ple, one study found that 23% of all unmarried Americans aged
tventy-five to twenty-nine were cohabiting with someone of the oppo-
site sex.14 Another study found that 13% of all United States adults
(not only unmarried ones) aged twenty-five to twenty-nine were co-
habiting. 15 This suggests that cohabitation will become an increas-
ingly common family type in the United States.
11 See Having t Both Ways, supra note 10, at 54; see also Kiernan, supra note 9, at 26
(including a table giving the percentage of cohabitating people according to age
group and sek). Denmark has the highest percentage. It has been estimated that the
approximate percentage of all couples that are unmarried couples is 18% in Sweden,
14% in France, 9% in Great Britain, 8% in Germany, 4% in Italy, and 3% in Spain.
See Having It Both Ways, supra note 10, at 54. But see Pascale Kr~mer, Le Mariage a Cesse
d'itre lacteFondateurdu Couple LE MONDE, Dec. 9, 1999, at 10 (estimating that 16% of
all French couples are cohabitants).
See also Claude Martin & Irene Thery, The PACS and Marriage and Cohabitation in
France, 15 INT'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAm. 135, 136 (2001) (estimating that about one-sixth of
all couples in France are cohabitants). One commentator estimated that one of every
eight couples in England is a cohabitant. SeeJohn Haskey, Demographic Aspects of Co-
habitation in Great Britain, 15 ITr'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAM. 51, 66 (2001).
12 See Brendan Bolger, .Census Consensus, SYDNEY STAR OBSERVER, Sept. 4, 1997, at
11.
13 Nicholas Bala, Canada: Court Decisions on Same-Sex & Unmarried Partners, Spousal
Rights & Children, in INTERNATIONAL SociETY OF FAMILY LAW 2001 StRVEV (Andrew
Bainham ed., forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at text accompanying n.22, on file with
author) (citing STATISTICS CANADA, 1996 CENSUS).
14 See LARY L. BuMPAss &JARIEs A. SWEET, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND UNION
STABILT'. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM NSFH2 fig.4 (Center for Demography and
Ecology, Univ. of Wis.-Madison, NSFH Working Paper No. 65, 1995); Larry Bumpass
& Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children's Family Contexts in
the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 32 (2000). The English government esti-
mates that 25% of unmarried men and women age sixteen to forty-nine are cohab-
iting. Frances Gibb, Law Society to Support Gay Reforms, TIMES (London), Sept. 20,
1999, at 2.
15 See Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGAPmy 483, 485 (1995).
Gore Vidal made this comment about the trend, with characteristic Vidalian hyper-
bole: "My impression is that the only people interested in marriage are Catholic
priests and homosexualists. Most enlightened heterosexuals now avoid marriage in
much the same way as Count Dracula steers clear of garlic." VIEWS FROM A WINDOW:
CONVERSATIONS WrrH GoEE VmAL 301 (RobertJ. Stanton & Gore Vidal eds., 2d ed,
1980).
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1. Regulation of Heterosexual Cohabitation
Many Western jurisdictions do not consider unmarried cohabita-
tion a separate status.1 6 When the relationship ends, neither party has
rights vis-a-iAs the other (except for child support), unless a generally
accepted cause of action between parties who were not cohabiting can
be established, such as one based on a theory of contract, unjust en-
richment, or trust' 7
No American state currently lets heterosexual couples register for
any meaningful status. 18 In most states, the choices are among mar-
riage, contract cohabitation, or no rights.' 9 (And, of course, contract
cohabitation is not a "status" that would entitle a partner to benefits
such as health insurance coverage through his or her partner's em-
ployer and the partners couldn't file a joint tax return.)
The current United States "majority rule" toward unmarried het-
erosexual cohabitants is consistent with the policies in a number of
other Western countries. A few countries now let straight couples opt
into some status other than marriage. For example, the Netherlands
lets straight couples opt into a status other than marriage ("registered
partnership"), and that election has significant consequences.20 Like-
16 See, e.g.,JoN MEE THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF CoHTsrrEF 21 (1999).
17 In two states, Texas and Minnesota, any contractual claim must be based on a
written agreement. See TEx. FAMt. CODE ANN. § 1.108 (Vernon 1998); MKNN. STAT.
ANN. § 513.075 (West 1990). For a discussion of cohabitants' property rights in four
common-law countries, see generally MEE, supra note 16.
It apparently is unclear whether cohabitation contracts are enforceable in En-
gland. See Mark Pawlowski, Cohabitation Contracts-Are Thgy Legal?, 146 NEv LJ. 1125,
1125 (1996). The enforceability of cohabitation contracts in Canada, as of 1993, is
discussed in OrrAmo LAw REmoaR CoMN'N, REPORT ON THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIII-.
TIES OF CoHABrrANTrs UNDER THE FAILY I-,w Acr 9 n.5 (1993).
18 California permits a couple to register as domestic partners for very limited
purposes, if each of them is older than sixty-two. Cvu. FA. CODE § 298 (West 1994 &
Supp. 2001).
19 See OLDHAm, supra note 3, § 1.02 (discussing the claims available for disputes
between cohabitants). See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Poperty R ghts, Arising
from Relationship of Couple Cohabitation thout Marriage, 3 A.LR.4th 13 (1979).
In some states, if cohabitants marry and later divorce, in fashioning the economic
award at divorce some courts consider as an equitable factor that the parties cohab-
ited before marriage. See, eg., In re Rolf, 27 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 1106 (Mont. Dec. 27,
2000). Some courts treat the cohabitants in such a situation as effectively ha%ing a
common-law marriage, even in states that ostensibly don't accept that type of mar-
riage. See Northrop v. Northrop, 27 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 1191 (N.D.Jan. 18, 2001).
Of course, not all states agree with this approach. See Stoner v. Stoner, 27 Fam. L
Rep. (BNA) 1143 (Tenn. Ct App. Feb. 15, 2001).
20 See Wendy M. Schrama, Registered Partnership in the Netherlands, 13 INT'. J.L
POL'Y & FAm. 315, 315-18 (1999). Nova Scotia now permits straight couples to opt
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wise, the French "PACS" (Pacte Civil de Solidarite et du Concubinage)
lets straight couples (and other family members) opt into a status
other than marriage, but this has less private law significance than that
resulting under Dutch law for a registered partnership filing.2 1
Couples are required to draw up a written agreement summarizing
the rights and obligations that will arise in connection with the rela-
tionship.22 In Belgium, straight or gay couples may elect into a status
other than marriage; if this is done, one ramification is that there is a
presumption that all property acquired during the relationship is
jointly owned. 23 Catalonia lets gay or straight couples elect to form a
"stable union."24
An increasing number ofjurisdictions treat unmarried heterosex-
ual cohabitation as a status *for some purposes even if no affirmative
joint filing is made. In New South Wales, since 1984 heterosexual co-
habitants have had the right to claim post-dissolution support and a
property award in some instances, if the relationship lasted at least two
years or the parties had a child together.25 The right to a property
into the status of "domestic partners," which is the equivalent to marriage. Law Re-
form (2000) Act, ch. 29, § 45, available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/legi/legc/bills/
58th_1st/3rdread/b075.htm.
21 See Martin & Thery, supra note 11, at 149. See generally Anne Barlow & Rebecca
Probert, Reforming the Rights of Cohabitants-Lessons from Across the Channel, 29 FAM. L.
477, 477-79 (1999); Suzanne Deley, France Gives Legal Status to Unmarried Couples, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1999, at A3; Eva Steiner, The Spirit of the New French Registered Partnership
Law-Promoting Autonomy and Pluralism or Weakening Marriage?, 12 CiiLD & FAm. L.Q.
1 (2000).
22 See generally Anne Barlow & Rebecca Probert, Addressing the Legal Status of Cohab-
itation in Britain and France: Plus ra Change ... 2, at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1999/
issue3/barlow3.html (last modified June 28, 1999).
23 See Caroline Forder, European Models of Domestic Partnership Law: The Field of
Choice, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371, 383-85 (2000) (citing BELGIAN CIV. CODE Art, 1478
(1998)). This does not apply to property if the record title is in the name of one
party. Id.
24 Dr. Miquel Martin Casals, Marriage-like Relationships and New Family Forms:
The Legislation of the Catalan Parliament Within the Spanish Framework, Address at
the International Society of Family Law, North American Conference 1 (June 10-12,
1999) (transcript on file with author). The new law is also discussed generally in
Gabriel Garcia Cantero, The Catalan Family Code of 1998 and Other Autonomous Region
Laws on De Facto Unions, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 397 (Andrew
Bainham ed., 2001).
25 See Reg Graycar & Jenni Millbank, The Bride Wore Pink... to the Property (Rela-
tionships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999: Relationship Law Reform in New South Wales, 17
CAN.J. FAm. L. 227, 238-40 (2000). Similar legislation exists in South Australia, Victo-
ria, the Northern Territory, and the Australian Capital Territory. See id. at 244 n.39,
see also DoRoTHY KOVACS, DEFACTO PROPERTY PROCEEDINGS IN AUSTRALIA 10-11
(1998); Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Financial Rights in Relationships Outside Marriage: A Dec-
(VOL- 76:51414
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award is much more limited than the marital property rights of
spouses.26 (Parties may opt out of this system via a written contract,
but few appear to be doing so. 27) Legislation adopted by the Catalan
Parliament provides an expanded quantum meruit claim and a poten-
tial claim for maintenance upon the termination of a "stable" hetero-
sexual union, which is defined as one lasting at least two years or one
where there is a common child.28 Similarly, in most Canadian prov-
inces a heterosexual cohabitant is able to sue for post-dissolution sup-
port (but not a property award) if the relationship lasted more than
the specified minimum duration, which differs from province to prov-
ince.29 In Walsh v. Bona,3 0 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeals ruled in
ade of Reforms in Australia, 9 IN'LJ.L. & Fhi. 233, 234-37 (1995) (discussing dura-
tional requirements for cohabitation in South Australia and New South Wales).
26 See Graycar & Millbank, supra note 25, at 244 n.39; see also Bailey-Harris, supra
note 25, at 238-39; Judith Housego, De Facto Rflationships Property Claims--Some Cer-
tainty, at Least for Now, 11 AUSTL.J. FAus. L 239, 239-40 (1997) (discussing cases that
have shaped property division between cohabitants in Australia).
27 Belinda Fehlberg & Bruce Smyth, Pre-nuptial Agrienentsfor Australia: 1171y N'ot?,
14 AusTL. Fi. L.J. 80, 94 (2000).
28 Act 10 of Ley de Uniones Estables de Parejas (Regarding Stable Pair Relation-
ships) (D.O.G.C. 1998, 9155) (Spain), available at http://i%, ,%.gencat.es/justiciat/
normes/angl/ll0e.htm (last modified Aug. 10, 2001); Martin Casals, supra note 24, at
5-7.
29 See generally Martha Bailey, Marriage and Marriagclihe Rdationships; Law Commis-
sion of Canada, available at http://vw.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/biley/in-
dex.html (last modifiedJan. 2, 2001). Dr. Bailey states that post-dissolution support is
possible in Nova Scotia if the relationship lasted at least one year, while a relationship
duration of three years is required in Ontario and five years in Manitoba. Id.; see, e.g.,
Ontario Family Law Reform Act of 1986, R.S.O., ch. F-3, §§ 29-30 (1990) (Can.).
In Alberta, a person now may claim support at the end of a heterosexual relation-
ship if (i) it lasted at least three years, or (ii) they had a common child and the
relationship was of some permanence. See Domestic Relations Amendment Act, 1999,
ch. 20, § 2, 2 SA 539, 539 (Can.); Alberta Law Foundation, Common Lao Relationships
FAQs, at http://v.law-faqs.org/ab/comm.htm (last modified June 2000).
British Columbia permits a spousal support claim for a 'marriage-like relation-
ship" (straight or gay) that lasted at least two years. Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C., ch.
128, §§ 1, 89 (1996) (amended Oct. 1, 1998) (Can.).
For a discussion of recent developments in Canada, see generally Bala, supra note
13.
Shared property rights due to cohabitation is a possible remedy for heterosexual
cohabitants only in the Northwest Territories. See Family Law Act, S.N.I,.T., ch. 18,
§ 1 (1997) (Can.). Compared to U.S. law, Canadian law does permit a much broader
constructive trust remedy for a partner who provides domestic services in a long co-
habitation relationship. SeePeterv. Beblow, [1993] S.C.R. 980 (Can.). &egenerallyW.
HOLLAND & B. STALBECKER-PoUNTNEY, COHABITATION: THE LAw IN Cv,-zA (1990).
30 97 A.C.W.S.3d 287 (Nova Scotia Ct. App. 2000), available at 2000 A.C.W.S.J.
LEXIS 4240.
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2000 that it was a violation of Canada's Charter of Rights and Free-
doms not to include within the definition of "spouse," for purposes of
the right to a division of property at the end of a relationship, hetero-
sexual cohabitants who had cohabited for a long period.31 The court
gave the legislature a period of time to respond to this decision.3 2
Washington courts have established a rule that heterosexual cohabi-
tants may seek an award relating to property accumulated during the
relationship (but not a support award), if the relationship was of a
duration and had other characteristics that cause the court to deter-
mine that it was "meretricious."33 An Oregon court has stated that a
court has "equitable powers" to reach a "fair result" at the end of a
cohabitation. 34 In Denmark, a heterosexual cohabitant might receive
an award based on unjust enrichment; in Sweden and Norway, hetero-
sexual cohabitants are considered to own jointly property acquired for
the home.35 In Hungary, there is a presumption that property ac-
quired by gay or straight cohabitants during their relationships is
jointly owned.36 In France, a union libre (sometimes called concubi-
nage) has for some purposes been treated as a marriage. 37
So, it seems that two different regulatory models for heterosexual
cohabitation seem to be evolving. One model (the Jerry Hall/Mick
Jagger view and currently the U.S. majority view) gives cohabitants no
status-based rights at the end of a cohabitation, other than child sup-
31 See Bala, supra note 13 (manuscript at text accompanying n.28).
32 Id. (manuscript at text accompanying n.31).
33 See In reMarriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 769-70, 773 (Wash. 2000); Con-
nell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37 (Wash. 1995). Oregon may permit equitable
awards at dissolution even absent a recognized claim based on contract, unjust enrich-
ment, or trust theories. Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1993);
Shuraleffv. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 768 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
34 Wilbur, 850 P.2d at 1153.
35 See Cohabitees (Joint Homes) Act, S.F.S. 1987:232, § 3, amended by S.F.S.
1991:627 (Swed.); Matthew Fawcett, Taking the Middle Path: Recent Swedish Legislation
Grants Minimal Property Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 24 FAM. L.Q. 179, 179 (1990);
Forder, supra note 23, at 376-81; Deborah M. Henson, A Comparative Analysis of Same-
Sex Partnership Protections: RecommendationsforAmerican Reform, 7 INT'LJ.L. & FAM. 282,
287 (1993); Ingrid Lund-Andersen, Cohabitation and Registered Partnership in Scandina-
via: The Legal Position of Homosexuals, in THE CHANGING FAMILY-FAMILY FoRMS AND
FAMILY LAW 397, 402-03 (John Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo eds., 1998) (discuss-
ing the Norwegian Joint Household Act 1991, Act No. 45, and explaining that, in
Norway, a cohabitant might also be given an interest in the family home, if the cohabi-
tation lasted at least two years); Ingrid Lund-Andersen, Moving Towards an Individual
Principle in Danish Law, 4 INT'LJ.L. & FAM. 328, 336-39 (1990).
36 See PTK., ch. 46, § 578 (Hung.); Forder, supra note 23, at 376.
37 See Daniele Huet-Weiller, "L'union libre" (La cohabitation sans Mariage), 29 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 247, 250-56 (1981); Steiner, supra note 21, at 6.
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port, even if there is a common child. The other model gives cohabi-
tants some status rights, but not all the rights of a married couple, if
the cohabitation meets the minimum duration standard set forth. Of
this latter group, some give cohabitants a right to claim post-dissolu-
tion support,-a while others give shared property rightss 9
2. Regulation of Gay Cohabitation
For purposes of regulating unmarried couples, most U.S. states
do not distinguish between straight and gay couples. No significant
status is possible; the only option offered is contract cohabitation. 40 A
couple of states have adopted a different policy, in both instances
prodded to do so by their respective state supreme court.41 Hawaii
adopted a "reciprocal beneficiary" law, which permits gay couples to
register and thereby obtain some rights.42 Vermont's "civil union" law
permits gay couples to register and obtain almost all of the private
rights married couples have. 4a California now permits a gay couple to
file a "declaration of domestic partnership," but its effects are mini-
mal.44 In Washington, heterosexual cohabitants can be treated as a
38 For example, many Australian states and Canadian provinces give cohabitants
such rights. See supra notes 24, 28-29 and accompanying text.
39 For example, Washington, Hungary, and Scandinavia give shared property
rights. See supra notes 33, 35-36 and accompanying text.
40 California does let gay couples register as domestic partners, which has very
limited effects. See C.U. FANI. CODE § 298 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). The status elec-
tion possible in Hawaii and Vermont (available only to gay couples) has more signifi-
cant effects. See sources cited infra notes 42-43.
41 See Robert E. Rains, The Evolving Status of SameSex Unions in Hawaii, Alaska,
Vermont and Throughout the United States, in 4 Co-rumpoaRY IssuEs iN LNw 71, 82,
90-91 (Deborah Lockton et al. eds., 1999).
42 See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 57204 (Michie 1999); Martha Bailey, Hawaii's
Sarte-Sex Marriage Initiatives: Implications for Canada, 15 AN.J. Fm. L 153, 161 (1998);
W. Brian Burnette, Note, Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resok'-
ing the Controversy Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS LJ. 81, 81-82
(1998-1999).
43 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5160 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207
(Supp. 2000); KRAUSE Er Ar-, supra note 3, at 37; Carey Goldberg, Vermont Gives Fimal
Approval to Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 2000, at A12.
44 See CA- F Au. CODE § 298 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). A number of cities per-
mit gay couples to register as domestic partners; the effect of such a registration is also
quite limited, although a partner may be able thereby to obtain health insurance
coverage if the other partner is a city employee. See Sanford N. Katz, EmeginglModels
for Alternatives to Marriage 33 FAus. L.Q. 663, 669 (1999); see, e.g., CAMBRIDcE, MASS.,
MUN. CODE ch. 2.119 (2000); S.F., CA., ADmtuN. CODE §§ 62.1-62.8 (2001); N.Y., N.Y.,
AD I. CODE §§ 3-240 to -244 (1998).
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"meretricious" relationship (with shared property rights); one case
has ruled, however, that gay couples cannot.45
Although the rule in most U.S. states regarding unmarried
straight couples is consistent with one of the two prevailing regulatory
models in the West, the majority rule toward gay couples differs from
the emerging Western consensus. During the past decade, more and
more countries have accepted that gay couples should be able to elect
into some status (but not marriage), 46 and this election has significant
consequences. This policy was first promulgated in Denmark in
198947 and then was accepted throughout Scandinavia, 48 and has re-
cently been adopted by the Netherlands. 49 Gay couples may establish
45 See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App., 2000), appeal
docketed, 11 P.3d 825 (Wash. 2000).
46 In 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to permit gays to many. See
Same-Sex Dutch Couples Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights, N.Y. TIIES, Dec. 20, 2000, at
A6; see also Caroline Forder, Opening Up Marriage to Same Sex Partners and Providing for
Adoption by Same Sex Couples, Managing Information on Sperm Donors, and Lots of Private
International Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMLY LAw 239, 247-51 (Andrew
Bainham ed., 2000) (discussing the process by which the legislation permitting same-
sex marriages came about).
The various approaches to gay cohabitation that now exist in Europe are dis-
cussed in LAW COMMISSION OF NEW ZEALAND, STUDY PAPER 4, RECOCNISINO SAME-SMX
RELATIONSHIPS (1999).
47 See Linda Nielsen, Family Rights and the "Registered Partnership" in Dennarh, 4
INT'LJ.L. & FAM. 297, 298 (1990).
48 Norway adopted its ,legislation in 1993, Sweden in 1995, Iceland in 1996, and
the Netherlands in 1998. Kees Waaldijk, Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform in the
Legal Position of Same-Sex Partners in Europe, 17 REVUE CANADIENNE DE DROIT FAMILIAL
62, 80 (2000); see also Lund-Andersen, Cohabitation and Registered Partnership in
Scandanavia, supra note 35, at 397 & nn.2-4.
For translations of some of these laws, see Marianne Roth, The Norwegian Act on
Registered Partnership for Homosexual Couples, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 467, 467-68
(1996-1997) (Norway); and Jorge Martin, Note, English Polygamy Law and the Danish
Registered Partnership Act: A Case for the Consistent Treatment of Forkgn Polygamous Mar-
riages and Danish Same-Sex Marriages in England, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 419, 430-31
(1994) (Denmark).
For a comparative discussion of these laws, see generally Henson, supra note 35.
49 See Schrama, supra note 20, at 315. In late 2000, the Netherlands became the
first country to enact a law permitting gay couples to marry. See supra note 46. Both
gay and straight partners can opt into the status of "domestic partners" in Nova Scotia,
See Law Reform (2000) Act, S.N.S., ch. 29, § 45, available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/
legi/legc/bills/58th lst/3rd_read/b075.htm.
As of August 1, 2001, Germany permits couples to enter into a "registered life
partnership." This status creates inheritance rights in the surviving partner, but such
couples do not get the same tax advantages of married couples and cannot adopt. See
Same-Sex Partners Win Legal Status in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at A3.
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a "PACS" in France and a "stable union" in Catalonia, both by an af-
firmative act by both parties.50
New South Wales took a different approach toward gay couples
with its 1999 amendments, which extended its policy adopted in 1984
regarding heterosexual cohabitants to gay couples. Pursuant to this
change, all cohabiting gay couples now potentially may sue for post-
dissolution support and a (limited) property adjustment claim, as
long as the relationship lasted at least two years (even if the parties did
not formally opt into any status).5I Queensland apparently adopted a
similar law in late 1999.52 Similarly, in British Columbia, a partner in
a gay cohabitation relationship may sue the other for support at the
end of the relationship, as long as the relationship lasted at least two
years.53 The Canadian Supreme Court has suggested that it is a viola-
tion of Canada's Charter to bar a dependent member of a same-sex
cohabitation relationship from seeking post-dissolution support.5
So, some countries have merely extended their rules regarding
heterosexual cohabitants to gay couples. The growing trend, how-
ever, is to create a status that only gay couples may opt into.
In most Western jurisdictions, I would summarize prevailing poli-
cies in this way: (i) unmarried partners either (a) have no rights or
obligations arising from the relationship (other than child support)
unless they either enter into an agreement or take an afflrmative act
to create a status or (b) are given some rights, but fewer rights than
married people (even if they do not opt into a status); (ii) unmarried
heterosexual couples may not elect any status other than marriage;
and (iii) it is increasingly common that gay couples may opt into some
status, but not marriage. Is this a sensible regime?
B. The American Law Institute's Recommendations
Compared to the evolving Western consensus discussed above,
the drafters of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law ofFarm-
ily Dissolution take a very different approach to the rights of unmarried
50 See Steiner, supra note 21, at 1; Martin Casals, supra note 24, at 5. On "PACS,"
see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51 See Graycar & Millbank, supra note 25, at 248-54; Jenni Millbank, The Property
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (NS119, 13 Aus-t.. Fvs. LJ. 93, 93 (1999).
52 See Graycar & Millbank, supra note 25, at 244 n.39, 247 n.46.
53 See Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 128, §§ 1, 89 (1996) (amended Oct. 1,
1998) (Can.).
54 See Bala, supra note 13 (manuscript at text accompanying nn.5-8) (discussing
AM. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.)).
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partners.55 They appear to agree that, when the relationship begins,
unmarried partners initially should have no rights or obligations due
to the relationship. This is not .totally clear, because any partner to a
relationship of any duration may attempt to prove that the partners
"for a significant period of time... shared a primary residence and a
life together as a couple."56 The drafters do not define what should
constitute a "significant period" for this purpose.5 7
The most surprising aspect of the suggested model is that it pro-
poses (for private law purposes) that gay or straight unmarried part-
ners be treated as spouses if the relationship satisfies certain
standards. If partners maintain a common household for a period
greater than a specified "cohabitation period," it would be presumed
that the parties shared "life together as a couple."58 No specific "co-
habitation period" is recommended, but the report states that three
years would be a "reasonable choice."5 9 Whether partners in fact
shared a common life together as a couple would be determined
based on a review of thirteen factors.60 Alternatively, parties could
also be treated as spouses if they cohabit with their common child for
a minimum specified period, known as the "cohabitation parenting
period."'61 It is suggested that this period be shorter than the "cohabi-
tation period" chosen.62 The Comment suggests that a period of two
years would be "appropriate" for this purpose.63
No affirmative act by both parties, such as a registration of some
type, is required to create the status proposed under the ALI model.
Very few jurisdictions have adopted a policy of this type toward un-
married partners.64 (It might be thought of as an attempt to update
55 See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES (Tentative
Draft 2000)).
56 Id. § 6.03(6).
57 The statute does suggest that an important factor is whether the relationship
has changed the circumstances of either party. See id.
58 Id. § 6.03(3).
59 Id. cmt. at 23.
60 Id. § 6.03(7).
61 Id. § 6.03(2).
62 Id. cmt. at 23.
63 Id. Parties may opt out of this system by written agreement, subject to the same
equitable limits applicable to premarital agreements. Id. § 6.01(3).
64 Nova Scotia may have backed into such a policy due to Walsh v. Bona, discussed
supra text accompanying note 30. This policy apparently now exists in the Northwest
Territories in Canada. See supra note 29. The current New Zealand government has
proposed legislation that would treat cohabitants who have lived together for three
years as spouses. See Blumberg, supra note 10, at 1299 n.140.
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the definition of common-law marriage, which is accepted in some
U.S. jurisdictions.) I will discuss below why I do not support these
recommendations.6 5
So, it seems that at least three policy questions regarding unmar-
ried partners are ripe for consideration: (i) what is a sensible regula-
tory regime for gay couples; (ii) what rights and obligations, if any,
should unmarried straight partners have if they make no express
agreement or take no affirmative act to elect into any status; and (iii)
is there any need for some alternative status, other than marriage, for
straight couples? In this Article, I will focus on the last two questions.
II. TBE REGULATION OF UNARRMED HET=ROSEXUAL PARTNERS IN
THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTuRY
A. Rules Regarding the Initial Relationship Period
There seems little support for a reversion to what in practice ap-
parently was U.S. policy in many states toward unmarried heterosex-
ual partners living together about a century ago-to treat them
immediately as married. 66 Almost all commentators, as well as the
drafters of the ALI proposal, accept that some "trial" period should be
accepted where no rights arise (unless the parties agree to the con-
trary). 67 If this is so, what "trial" period seems sensible?
As this Article was going to press, this legislation was enacted. &e Property (Rela-
tionships) Amendment Act of 2001 (N.Z.), available at http://ww%%.brookers.co.nz/
property act/defaulthtm (last visitedJuly 29, 2001). In addition to this New Zealand
legislation, one might also note that Canada appears to be heading in a similar direc-
tion. Unmarried partners have post-dissolution support rights if the relationship
lasted a certain specified minimum period, and cohabitants in long-term cohabitation
relationships have broad rights to property accumulated by the partners during the
relationship pursuant to an expanded constructive trust remedy. See supra note 29.
In Australia, many states permit cohabitants to make a claim for property when a
relationship ends, but the grounds for such a claim are much more limited than those
given spouses. (Post-dissolution support rights are also possible.) See supra note 25.
Some Latin American countries have created substantial private law remedies for
cohabitants in some instances. SeeJose E. Arraros, Concubinage in Latin America, 3J.
F . L. 330, 334-39 (1963); Delia B. Ifligo, Argentina-A A'ew Legal Approach to the De
Facto Union, in THE INT nONAI. SURVEy OF FAm.y LAw 1997, at 13, 15-20 (Andrew
Bainham ed., 1999); Eduardo Le Riverend-Brusone, Anomalous Mainiages, 10 Miami
L.Q. 481, 484-87 (1956); A. Sanchez-Cordero, Cohabitation WIthout Marriage in Mexico,
29 A.J. Comsp. L 279, 282-84 (1981).
65 See infra text accompanying notes 66-106.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
67 See, e.g., ALI P, Ncn'i.Es (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 55, § 6.03(l)-(3),
(7).
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Empirical studies have found that, in the United States, most un-
married heterosexual partners either marry or break up in a relatively
short time. About half of U.S. cohabitants marry.68 Of those who do
not marry, one-sixth last three years and about 10% last five years 69
So, if a trial period of three years would be accepted, it appears that
most cohabitants would still be able to experience a "trial" period dur-
ing which no rights or responsibilities would result (unless the parties
made an agreement to the contrary).
Some have been critical of any such "safe harbor" trial period,
expressing concern that such a system would permit "strategic behav-
ior," such as breaking up shortly before the specified trial period ex-
pires. 70 Such "strategic behavior" may well have been reflected in the
timing of the divorce decision by the actor Tom Cruise. He alleges in
his divorce petition that he and his wife separated days before their
tenth anniversary.71 Until a recent change in the California Family
Code, California courts presumptively awarded lifetime support to
spouses married at least ten years before separation.72 In marriages of
shorter duration, the California custom has been to award support
for, at most, half the duration of the marriage.73 I would submit that
this is precisely the advantage of what I am proposing. Under such a
system, people would be given the freedom to cohabit for less than a
68 See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 14, at 33.
69 Id.; see also Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of
Marriage 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 919 (1991) (discussing the characteristics of
cohabitors); Arland Thornton, Cohabitation and Marriage in the 1980s, 25 DEMOcRAPIIm
497, 504-06 (1988) (discussing rates of cohabitation termination).
For similar Canadian results, see Zheng Wu & T.R. Balakrishnan, Dissolution of
Premarital Cohabitation in Canada, 32 DEMOGRAP'Y 521, 526 (1995). Kiernan finds that
the median duration of cohabitation in Europe is less than two years in most coun-
tries. Kiernan, supra note 9, at 29.
The average duration of cohabitation in France may be longer. See generally
Henri Leridon, Cohabitation, Marriage, Separation: An Analysis of Life Histories of French
Cohorts from 1968 to 1985, 44 POPULATION STUD. 127 (1990) (analyzing cohabitation in
France and its effect on marriage).
For a discussion of the rate of breakdown of cohabitation relationships in Eu-
rope, see Kiernan, supra note 10, at 7-8.
70 SeeALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 55, § 6.03(2)-(3) cmt. at
28.
71 See Anne-Marie O'Neill, Cruising for Contro4 PEOPLE, Feb. 26, 2001, at 74, 76;
The End of the Aussie-American Pact, TIME, Feb. 19, 2001, at 88.
72 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Baker, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 557 (Ct. App. 1992)
(pointing out that the ten-year standard is not absolute and that permanent alimony
is possible in shorter marriages).
73 See O'Neill, supra note 71, at 74, 76; The End of the Aussie-American Pact, supra
note 71, at 88.
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specified trial period, knowing that no rights or obligations would re-
sult, unless a contract to the contrary was made. Courts would be
spared a large number of mostly frivolous claims.
I have expressed elsewhere my belief that claims for shared prop-
erty rights and post-dissolution support are more persuasive in rela-
tionships when a person is acting as the primary caretaker of a
common child.74 So, I would contend that the case for a trial period
creating no rights and obligations is particularly strong for those in
childless relationships. At a minimum, any "trial" period for childless
relationships, therefore, should be longer than that for those involv-
ing a common child.
One could imagine a similar and potentially more serious "strate-
gic" issue. People might break up shortly before the end of the trial
period and then resume cohabiting shortly thereafter. To the extent
that longer duration cohabitation relationships do create more rights,
different periods of cohabitation should probably be added together
to determine whether the minimum duration specified had been satis-
fied, at least where the period of "break-up" was relatively brief.
B. Longer-Term Relationships
If one accepts that a "trial" period of some short duration should
not create any rights or obligations, the only remaining question
would be whether another regulatory approach seems appropriate for
cohabitation relationships that endure for a longer period. This is not
an insignificant percentage of cohabitants. One study found that 19%
of all cohabitants had neither broken up nor married after four
years.75
Some defend the current English and U.S. majority view (that
cohabitation never should impose any right or obligation, other than
child support, absent an agreement) because this policy is consistent
with the parties' intentions.76 Unfortunately, no study clearly shows
what heterosexual cohabitants "intend" by not marrying. Few seem to
74 See J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAt. L RE%. 1091,
1125-29 (1992).
75 See Wendy D. Manning & PamelaJ. Smock, y. MaV?: Race and Transition to
Marriage Among Cohabitors, 32 DrF~ocRAM' 509, 512 (1995).
76 See generally MicHAmL D.A. FRFmiN & CHRISTINA M. LYoN, CotLAUrrxrto. WInTH-
OUT MARRIAGE (1983) (arguing, predominantly in the context of the British system,
against forcing marriage upon parties who do not want it); Ruth L Deech, The Case
Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, 29 INT'L & Co.wn. LQ. 480 (1980) (objecting
to legal recognition of cohabitation because of the negative effects such recognition
would have upon women).
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sign express agreements. 77 Some may indeed not want the rights and
responsibilities of marriage. Other couples may disagree-one may
want to marry while the other does not.78 A third group of couples
may have gradually evolved into a cohabitation relationship to save
rent or for some reason unrelated to a choice of rights and responsi-
bilities. From this perspective, it does seem unlikely that one can con-
clude all cohabitants have impliedly agreed that no rights and
obligations ever should arise from a cohabitation.
All studies to date have found that, when compared to spouses,
cohabitants are much less likely to pool their money.7 9 An Australian
study of divorced couples who had re-partnered found that 64% of
those who had remarried pooled their money, compared to 36% of
those who cohabited. 0 Of course, this does not show what all couples
intend. One might even wonder whether keeping money separate re-
flects a clear understanding not to share accumulations upon
separation.
Alternatively, one could defend the current U.S. majority view on
the basis that unmarried cohabitation is so morally offensive that par-
ties should be barred from litigating their rights in U.S. courts. Al-
though this may have been true generations ago,"' given the current
77 See Kirsti Strom Bull, Nonmarital Cohabitation in Norway, 30 SCANDINAVIAN STUD.
L. 29, 39 (1986) (reporting that 5% of Norwegian cohabitants and 6% of Danish
cohabitants signed agreements). For a similar statement about Australian cohabi-
tants, see Fehlberg & Smyth, supra note 27, at 93.
78 One interviewer of cohabitants. found that, in about 20% of the couples, one
partner expected an eventual marriage and the other did not. Bumpass et al., supra
note 69, at 921.
79 See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER ScHWARTz, AMERIcAN CouPLEs 94 (1983). This
study of American couples found that about two-thirds of all spouses immediately
after marriage favored pooling their money, and fewer than 20% opposed it. Id. at 95
fig.8. In contrast, fewer than one-third of all heterosexual cohabitants favored pool.
ing, and more than one-third opposed it. Id. at 95 fig.8.
An English study found that 24% of cohabitants kept their money separate, as
compared to 6% of married couples. See Helen Glezer & Eva Mills, Controlling the
Purse Strings, 29 FAm. MATrERS 35, 35 (1991).
80 See Ruth E. Weston, Financial Arrangements and Personal Income, in SETrLING UP:
PROPERTY AND INCOME DIsRuBUriON ON DIVORCE IN AUSTRALIA 131, 132 (Peter Mc-
Donald ed., 1986).
81 SeeJ. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudill, A Reconnaissance of Public Policy Re-
strictions upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Cohabitants, 18 FAM. L.Q. 93, 106-07
(1984).
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prevalence of cohabitation and its increasing social acceptance, this
seems a poor justification for the current U.S. rule.8 2
In contrast to the current U.S. view, a number of commentators
argue that, after some specified duration, the private law effects of
cohabitation should be the same as marriage.as These commentators
emphasize that longer-duration cohabitation relationships resemble
marriages in many ways.8 4 For example, career damage can occur due
to roles assumed during a marriage or cohabitation. Due to this func-
tional resemblance, it is argued that the private law effects should be
identical.
In addition, some argue that cohabitants believe their legal rights
will be the same as those of a married couple (so they should be
treated the same).8 5 As mentioned above, there is little empirical evi-
dence showing what cohabitants believe. To justify the "U.S view,"
proponents make the opposite argument, that cohabitants intend not
to share property.8 6
One concern that has been voiced regarding treating cohabita-
tion as more of a status is that doing so would undermine marriage.87
It is hard to be certain whether recognizing cohabitation as a status
would discourage marriage. In jurisdictions that largely do not now
recognize cohabitation as a status, such as most of the U.S., England,
and Denmark, cohabitation continues to become more popular.
Would this trend be exacerbated with more legal recognition?
Eric Clive has argued that "it seems.., absurd to suggest that
nowadays people marry exclusively or primarily for property rea-
82 A few states do still criminalize cohabitation and sometimes prosecutions re-
sult. See, e.g.,Jim Yardley, Unmarried and Living Togher, Till the Sheriff Do Us Part, N.Y.
Tmms, Mar. 25, 2000, at A9.
83 See, e.g., ALI PRINCiPLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 55, § 6.02 cnt. at
10-14; LAW REFOrt COMA'N OF NOVA ScoTiA, FINAL RuoPRT ON REFORM OF TIHE Lw
DEALING WITH NITAhrIONIAL PRoPERiY IN NOVA SconA 18-24 (1997); O.r, mo Lw
REFORi COMNI'N, supra note 17, at 27-31; Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Law and the Unmar-
led Couple-Oppression or Liberation?, 8 CHLu & FAm. LQ. 137, 137 (1996); Richard
Chisholm et al., De Facto Property Decisions in NSW: Emerging Patterns and Policies, 5
AusT. J. FAm. L. 241, 241 (1991).
84 See sources cited supra note 83.
85 See ONTARIo LiW REFOnM COMN'N, supra note 17, at 28.
86 See supra text accompanying note 76.
87 See Anders Agell, The Swedish Legislation on Marriage and Cohabitation: AJourmy
Without aDestination, 24 ScANNAWiAN STUD. L 9, 45-47 (1980); Stephen Cretney, The
Law Relating to Unmarried Partnen from the Perspecite of a Law Reform Agent); in NLM-
RIAGE AND COHABITAnON IN CONEMiPORARY SocIEIES 357, 365 (John M. Eekelaar &
Sanford N. Katz eds., 1980); Lund-Andersen, Moving Towards an Individual Pdindple in
Danish Law, supra note 35, at 331.
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sons."s8 In contrast, data from Sweden could be used to support the
idea that giving cohabitants more rights can undermine marriage. Be-
tween 1977 and 1987, before Sweden had adopted any protection for
cohabitants, the annual number of women entering a first marriage,
per 1000 of population, dropped from seventy-six to forty-nine.89 In
the decade after the Swedish legislature adopted cohabitation rights
(1987-1996), the number dropped from forty-nine to thirty-three. 90
One could argue that this continued decline is related to the cohabi-
tation legislation. Alternatively, it could be argued that this merely
reflects the increasing popularity of cohabitation. Indeed, it could be
pointed out that the first marriage rate per 1000 population dropped
35% from 1977 to 1987, while it dropped "only" 32% from 1987 to
1996.
In addition to the "discouraging marriage" concern, the proposal
to equate the private law effects of longer-term cohabitation with mar-
riage starkly presents the question of why the law of many Western
jurisdictions now provides that marital property rights and post-disso-
lution support obligations can result from marriage. It seems to me
there are two rationales: (i) roles assumed in an intimate relationship
can create career damage to a partner; and (ii) the parties have
agreed to assume the status of spouses, which operates as an implied
acceptance of the legal rights and obligations of marriage. The for-
mer could be true in a cohabitation relationship, while the latter
could not (absent an agreement).
Another reason to be hesitant to treat unmarried partners like
spouses stems from the fact that cohabitants differ in significant ways
from spouses. In addition to the different ways mentioned above that
spouses and cohabitants often handle their finances,91 social scientists
have found that cohabitants are less committed to each other.9 2 For
example, Bumpass and Lu assert that "[a]s cohabitation becomes in-
creasingly accepted, cohabitations may include a greater proportion
88 E.M. Clive, Marriage: An Unnecessary Legal Concept , in MARRIAGE AND CoMlBlTA.
TION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES, supra note 87, at 71, 75.
89 See Forder, supra note 23, at 379.
90 See id
91 See supra note 79.
92 See, e.g., Stephen L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships,
16 J. EuF. IssuEs 53, 65-67 (1995); Carol Smart, Stories of Family Life: Cohabitation,
Marriage, and Social Change, 17 CAN. J. F~A. L. 20, 32 (2000).
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of couples with less serious commitments."93 Infidelity is more com-
mon as well.9 4
Should the private law rules regarding marriage be extended to
all cohabitation relationships that last a certain period? Alternatively,
should this rule only extend to cohabitations if there is a common
child (and career damage)? I am not persuaded that, for private law
purposes, childless cohabitation relationships of any duration should
be equated with spouses, because career damage due to roles assumed
in the relationship is unlikely. I have argued elsewhere that thejustifi-
cation for marital property rights and post-divorce support is much
stronger in relationships where there is a common child, because ca-
reer damage of a partner seems much more likely.95 In my view, the
claim for status-like rights for cohabitants is stronger in such
households.
Some have argued that creating status-like rights for cohabitants
who have not jointly elected the status is paternalistic and sexist, in
that it is actually intended to provide protection for women who are
assumed to be unable on their own to protect themselves legally.96
Indeed, some contend that such a policy would "treat cohabitation as
long term prostitution with delayed payment subject to arbitration."97
One compromise policy approach, which would acknowledge the
dependence that can result from cohabitation, particularly if there is a
common child, would be to consider cohabitation as a status if certain
specified attributes would be satisfied, but this status would entail
fewer rights and obligations than marriage.98 This "status" would re-
sult even though the parties had made no formal declaration or filing
to obtain it. This policy would respond to the fact that the parties had
not jointly agreed to assume a formal status. It would be consistent
with policies now in existence in many states in Australia, many Cana-
dian provinces, and in Washington, Norway, and Sweden.P In addi-
93 Bumpass & Lu, supra note 14, at 33.
94 SeeJudith Treas & Deirdre Giesen, SexualInfidelity AmongMariied and Cohabiting
Americans, 62J. MARRIAGE & F, i. 48, 59 (2000).
95 See Oldham, supra note 74, at 1114. Career damage could also result from the
relationship if a partner assumes a primary caretaker role for the other partner's
child. Cf id. at 1107.
96 See Ruth Deech, The Case Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, in MARIUAGE
AND COHABITATION IN CoNTE iPoRARY SocIErTEs, supra note 87, at 300, 303.
97 Id. at 303.
98 Professor Reppy has made a similar suggestion. SeeWilliam A. ReppyJr., Prop-
erty and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Status, 44
L-. L. REv. 1677, 1716-23 (1984).
99 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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don, because this approach treats cohabitants differently from
spouses, it presumably would be less likely to discourage marriage.
If this proposed compromise policy would be perceived as a sensi-
ble compromise, one would have to decide (i) what types of cohabita-
tion relationships give rise to such rights, and (ii) what the rights
would be. The Australian and Canadian approaches focus on a right
to post-separation support as the main right flowing from the relation-
ship, while Washington, Norway, and Sweden create joint ownership
of certain property, but do not provide for post-separation support
rights. 100
If U.S. marital property rules would be used as a guide for ajoint
ownership policy, one cause for concern would be the time and ex-
pense required to determine what is jointly owned. Namely, what was
acquired during marriage due to efforts, and what was acquired
before marriage or during marriage by gift or inheritance?' 0 1 Also,
the size of the marital estate may bear little resemblance to what may
be the most important concern-being able to provide adequate .tran-
sitional support to a dependent partner. So, it does seem that the
current Australian/Canadian approach offers some advantages to a
100 See supra notes 37 and 38.
Of course, these remedies would exist if the parties' relationship ended when
both were still alive. What might be appropriate if the relationship continued until
the death of a partner? Professor Fellows has found that, when asked, a substantial
majority of unmarried partners wanted their partners to receive a large portion of
their estate. .Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 38 (1998). This was true even when the partner was also
survived by a child from a prior relationship. Id.; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner,
MaritalProperty Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21 (1994). This study suggests that
creating intestacy rights for a surviving unmarried partner may well be congruent with
the intentions of many unmarried partners. Professor Waggoner goes one step far-
ther and advocates a forced share for a surviving unmarried partner in some circum-
stances, even if the will of the deceased partner does not leave anything to the
survivor. See Fellows et al., supra, at 92-95; Waggoner, supra, at 78-86. 1 would not
support such a forced share. A potential support right from the decedent's estate for
a dependent surviving partner, similar to the right which now exists under English
law, would be more consistent with my proposal.
England does give a surviving cohabitant certain support rights from the de-
ceased partner's estate, but not equivalent to those granted spouses. See Gillian Doug-
las, Marriage, Cohabitation, and Parenthood-From Contract to Status?, in CRoss CuRRENTs
211, 219 n.39 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000) (citing Law Reform (Succession) Act
1995, § 2).
In New Hampshire, those cohabitants who have cohabited for at least three years
and are still cohabiting when one dies are treated as married. N.H. RExv. STAT. ANN.
§ 457:39 (1992).
101 For a general discussion of U.S. rules about these matters, see OL-m, supra
note 3.
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marital property approach. 0 2 Of course, one drawback of post-disso-
lution support is that enforcement can be a problem.
I would propose that a cohabitant should be eligible for a post-
dissolution transitional support award, if the relationship lasted
longer than the "trial" period selected and the claimant was the pri-
mary caretaker of a common child. In addition, a state could permit a
transitional support order in childless relationships that lasted longer
than the trial period if a claimant suffered career damage due to the
relationship. This right to post-dissolution support for cohabitants
could be opted out of via an agreement, with the rules governed by
the state's law regarding waivers of post-divorce spousal support 10 3
One could highlight the differences in approaches toward un-
married partners by considering how the Marvins would be treated
under each regime. As everyone knows, after remand, Ms. Triola
eventually received nothing. 10 4 The ALI approach presumably would
treat the Marvins as if they had married. Under my approach, Ms.
Triola would have a transitional support right, as long as she could
establish career damage due to the relationship. So, the remedy
granted Ms. Triola by the trial court may well be appropriate under
the approach I propose.'05
If a new private law status for some "cohabitants" is created, one
could expect some gray areas. For example, what is "cohabitation"?106
If parties still have separate residences, but spend some nights to-
gether each week, would this be included?10 7 If one party "moves in"
with another and spends most if not all nights there, but still main-
tains an apartment elsewhere, has cohabitation begun? Or should the
critical date be when the person moves his or her belongings out of
the other apartment? The ALT Principles would require cohabitants to
be sharing a "primary residence," 08 which "must be the primary
102 Professor Reppy has suggested that the partners should have common prop-
erty rights in property accumulated during the relationship and limited support
rights. See Reppy, supra note 98, at 1720-21.
103 Some U.S. states permit such a waiver, others do not. See OumNi, supra note
3, § 4.03 [31(a).
104 Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Ct. App. 1981).
105 Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077, 3085 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1979).
106 Possibly only the French would argue about whether one could have two "co-
habitants" simultaneously. See Steiner, supra note 21, at 6 n.28 (noting a split of
authority).
107 In the Canadian case of Thauvette v. Maylon, [1996] 23 R.F.L4th 217, 222-24
(Ontario Gen. Div.), availabLe at 1996 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1464, such parties were consid-
ered cohabitants.
108 ALI Pmnicnt.Ls (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 55, § 6.03(1).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
abode of both parties."'0 9 So, it would appear that, at least under the
ALI view, the couple discussed above would not be "cohabitants" until
the party had given up the apartment.
A related practical question would be whether it would be diffi-
cult to prove whether a cohabitation relationship existed. Some have
suggested this would be difficult. Harry Krause has concluded,
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that unless a legal formality
"sanctifies" the partnership, the expense and uncertainty of litigat-
ing ex post facto whether a status actually existed and what it was or is
may well not be worth the unpredictability and trouble it would
cause in human relations. 110
While it is conceivable that a party's residence might be unclear
at times, it would seem that, in a world with driver's licenses, tax re-
turns, credit card bills, bank statements, utility bills, cable bills, tele-
phone bills, magazine subscriptions, and W-2 forms, among other
things, it would not be difficult after-the-fact to try to reconstruct the
general contours of where people lived. Certainly it would be useful
to investigate whether this has been a problem in Australia or Canada,
where post-dissolution support rights can flow from cohabitation, as
long as the cohabitation period lasted a certain specified minimum
duration."'
RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS
Short Term Longer Term; No Longer Term With
Relationship Common Child Common Child
Current U.S. View
ALl Proposal
Canada/Australia
Oldham Proposal
C. Is a New "Marriage Lite" Needed?
For generations, American theorists have speculated regarding
whether different types of marriage would be a good idea. For exam-
ple, the idea of a "trial marriage" has been proposed on more than
109 Id. § 6.03 cmt. at 20.
110 Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millenium: Heterosexual, Same-Sex-Or Not
at All?, 34 F.AM. L.Q. 271, 297 (2000).
111 See supra notes 21-26, 33 and accompanying text.
No rights No rights No rights
No rights probably Treat like spouses Treat like spouses
Post-dissolution Post-dissolution
No rights support possille support possible
Post-dissolution Post-dissolution
No rights support possible support possible
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one occasion for young, childless couples. 112 (Unmarried cohabita-
tion may well serve this role now for many couples.) More recently,
legislators and commentators have proposed covenant marriage, a
type of marriage with more restricted exits.113
A question less frequently asked today, at least regarding straight
couples, is whether couples should be given another status choice
other than marriage, one that would be "lighter" in its private law ef-
fects. "Temporary marriage" is possible in Iran, but this seems to have
no private law effect; it apparently exists so couples can evade the oth-
envise substantial penalties for premarital sex.114
California is the only state to date that has accepted such a "lite"
marriage status for straight couples. In California, a straight couple
may elect to be "domestic partners," but only if both are sixty-two or
older.115 This permits older couples to elect into a status without los-
ing rights either partner has as a surviving or divorced spouse, which
would be lost upon "remarriage." In addition, it may thereby be eas-
ier to get health insurance coverage through the partner's employer.
Hawaii's "reciprocal beneficiary" status creates more private law
rights than California's domestic partnership, but fewer than those of
spouses. 116 Reciprocal beneficiaries also get the right to sue for
wrongful death of a partner, hospital visitation rights, and inheritance
rights from the partner. (This status is now only available for gay
couples in Hawaii. 117 )
A number of other countries, such as France and the Nether-
lands, have created a status "lighter" in private law effects than mar-
riage that is available to straight couples.118
One could imagine that a significant number of straight couples
of any age might wish to establish some type of status, even though
they are not interested in all the traditional private law effects of mar-
riage." 9 In addition to establishing another type of (albeit limited)
112 See Deborah Schupack, 'Starter' Mariargs: So Early, So Brief, N.Y. Timtts, July 7,
1994, at C1 (discussing, among other things, the proposal made by Margaret Meade
in the 1960s to recognize "trial marriages").
113 SeeARrz. REv. STAT. ANN . §§ 25-901 to -906 (West 2000); L%. RE%. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:272, 9:275.1 (West 2000). See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Cove-
nant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 L. L RE%% 63 (1998).
114 See Elaine Sciolino, Love Finds a Way in Iran: "Temporary Mariage," N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2000, at A3.
115 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2001).
116 See Hv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5720-4 (Michie 1999).
117 See supra text accompanying note 42.
118 See supra notes 20-24.
119 For a detailed discussion of this matter, see Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cor-
nish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordi-
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public commitment, another incentive for people to opt into it would
be an increased ability to obtain health insurance coverage.' 20 If in-
creased coverage could be achieved via this new status, this would
have a number of positive social effects. More citizens would be in-
sured and have adequate health care. (This obviously is more of a
concern in the United States, compared to the many other Western
countries that have national health insurance for all.) Also, such a
result should reduce public expenditures for health care costs of the
uninsured poor.
Such a "lite" marriage option could have other ramifications, if
thought desirable, such as intestate inheritance rights of some kind
and the right to sue for wrongful death. It may be possible to incorpo-
rate into this election some type of clarification about the parties' un-
derstanding about their property rights. For example, the election
form could state that the parties will have no joint ownership rights in
property accumulated during the relationship or post-dissolution sup-
port rights unless they sign an agreement to the contrary. This is
done in connection with the French "PACS," for example. 12 1 Only
unmarried people should be permitted to opt into this status, and
only one such relationship could be registered at any one time. Since
the norm would be that (subject to an agreement to the contrary) the
parties would have no shared property rights or post-divorce support
obligations, terminating such a status would be fairly simple and could
be unilaterally done by a partner, with notice given to the other
partner.
Any discussion of creating a "lite" marriage runs into the chal-
lenge that it would undermine marriage. 12 2 But at least in those states
that have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, and in
other states that give spouses free reign to change marital property
rights and post-dissolution support rules contractually, parties are al-
ready given almost unlimited freedom to define the private law effects
of marriage. 123 They merely must draft a contract setting forth the
nances, 92 CoLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1165-79 (1992). See also Chambers, supra note 5, at
485-86 (discussing the advantages, financial and othenvise, of marital status over sin-
gle, cohabiting status).
120 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 119, at 1177 & n.25.
121 See Steiner, supra note 21, at 1.
122 Mike Allen, Cardinal Sees Marriage Harm in Partners Bill N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1998, at Al; Adrian Walker & Tina Cassidy, Cellucci Rejects City's Partners Bill, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 31, 1998, at Al.
123 UNi. PRE ARrrAL AGREEMENT Acr § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987); see also OLDILAM,
supra note 3, § 4.02 n.10 (listing the states that have adopted the original version of
the UPAA or a modified version).
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rules.124 So, people now may "marry" but, via a premarital agreement,
have no marital property rights or post-divorce support obligations.'2
How is this different, except in name, from the domestic partner rela-
tionship status I am proposing? It would merely save fie DeLoreans
of the world the transaction cost of drafting the agreement.
If one would adopt such a status, a drafter would need to be con-
cerned about other effects of such a status. Would a joint tax return
be required? Could a partner leave an estate of any amount free of
estate tax to the other partner? Would a post-dissolution support obli-
gation be dischargeable in bankruptcy?' 2 6
For political purposes, and to reduce public confusion, if such an
additional status would be created, it should be called something
other than marriage. Past terms that have been used are "domestic
partners" or "registered partners"; "intimate partners" also would be
possible. The term "registered partner" is helpful in that it connotes
that the status is obtained by registering.
CONCLUSION
I have summarized above comparative trends in the regulation of
heterosexual cohabitation. There currently is a great debate about
the best regulatory approach. Some jurisdictions retain the current
U.S. majority approach.127 An increasing number, however, treat
long-term cohabitation as a private law status, albeit one with fewer
ramifications than marriage.' 28 Finally, a growing number of com-
mentators urge that long-duration cohabitation should be treated like
marriage. 129
I have proposed that the current United States approach should
be changed, at least for those cohabitation relationships of some dura-
tion where a partner has suffered career damage due to the relation-
ship, either by being a primary caretaker for a common child or for
some other reason. Post-dissolution support should be possible in
such cases, unless the parties had made an enforceable agreement to
the contrary. So, as to the Jagger/Hall household, under this ap-
proach Ms. Hall would be entitled to post-dissolution "spousal" sup-
124 UNEa. PREairraAL AcGWENT Acr, supra note 123, at § 2.
125 See ag., DeLorean N% DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1261-62 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1986).
126 Professor Reppy discusses these matters in his article. &eReppy, supra note 98,
at 1714-16.
127 See ODHAxft, supra note 3, § 1.02; MEE, supra note 16, at 21.
128 See supra notes 25-37.
129 See sources cited supra note 83.
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port, but not marital property rights (unless she would be considered
a putative spouse).
I also propose the creation of some form of "lite" marriage for
heterosexuals (a registered partnership status or the like) that would
be created by a joint filing by a couple. Choosing this option could
create some potential benefits for the partners, not the least of which
would be to facilitate health insurance coverage. However, choosing
this status would result in no joint property rights or post-dissolution
support obligations, as long as the parties did not sign an agreement
to the contrary.
